Legal practitioner Melron C. Nicol-Wilson Esq. has challenged the procedure used by Parliament to pass the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Bill, 2025, arguing that the required two-thirds majority was not obtained during the parliamentary vote.

In a letter dated August 18, 2026, and addressed to the Right Honourable Speaker of Parliament, Segepoh Solomon Thomas, Melron C. Nicol-Wilson maintained that Parliament’s reported reliance on Section 91(1) of the 1991 Constitution was inappropriate for determining the voting threshold required to alter the country’s supreme law.

The letter, written under the name of Nicol-Wilson & Co., also known as Malaika Chambers, expressed what the law firm described as grave public-interest concerns over the proceedings conducted in Parliament on August 10, 2026.

The Bill seeks, among other changes, to amend Section 42(2)(e) of the Constitution by reducing the presidential electoral threshold from 55 per cent of valid votes cast to 50 per cent plus one.

Melron C. Nicol-Wilson said his concerns were consistent with arguments advanced by other legal practitioners and jurists who have publicly questioned the procedure Parliament followed.

He also noted that members of the main opposition All People’s Congress withdrew from the parliamentary proceedings before the vote, except for two lawmakers who remained in the Chamber.

According to Melron C. Nicol-Wilson, the 1991 Constitution is Sierra Leone’s supreme law and remains binding on every state institution, including Parliament and the Office of the Speaker.

He argued that Parliament cannot use what he described as unlawful, abusive or extra-constitutional methods to alter the Constitution, warning that doing so would amount to an unconstitutional constitutional amendment.

The legal practitioner stressed that constitutional safeguards governing amendments are not matters of parliamentary convenience or internal procedure. Rather, he said, they are mandatory legal conditions that determine whether Parliament has validly exercised its authority to amend the Constitution.

Melron C. Nicol-Wilson claimed that the Speaker wrongly directed Members of Parliament to apply Section 91(1) when voting on the Bill.

Section 91(1) provides that, except where the Constitution states otherwise, any question placed before Parliament should be determined by a majority of members present and voting.

Melron C. Nicol-Wilson, however, contended that the provision applies to ordinary parliamentary decisions and not to constitutional amendments for which the Constitution establishes a separate and higher voting threshold.

He identified Section 108(2)(b) as the applicable provision for amending the non-entrenched clauses of the Constitution.

Section 108(2)(b) states that a Bill seeking to alter the Constitution cannot be passed unless it is supported during its second and third readings by the votes of not less than two-thirds of Members of Parliament.

Melron C. Nicol-Wilson therefore argued that the constitutional threshold was not satisfied during the August 10 sitting and that the Bill could not have been validly passed under Section 91(1).

He explained that Section 91(1) refers specifically to members “present and voting,” while Section 108(2)(b) requires the support of “not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament.”

According to him, the framers’ decision to use different language in the two provisions means they were intended to establish different voting requirements.

He said there was no legal basis for inserting the words “present and voting” into Section 108(2)(b), as those words do not appear in the provision.

To support his argument, Melron C. Nicol-Wilson cited several judicial authorities, including R v Judge of the City of London Court, Alhaji Sam Sumana v Attorney-General and Minister of Justice and Victor Foh, and the South African Constitutional Court decision in S v Zuma.

He argued that the decisions reinforce the legal principle that clear constitutional language must be respected and given its ordinary meaning.

Melron C. Nicol-Wilson also invoked the Latin maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, which means that a specific legal provision takes precedence over a general one.

He described Section 91(1) as the general rule governing ordinary parliamentary voting and Section 108(2)(b) as the special rule governing constitutional amendments.

According to him, the special provision must prevail, particularly because Section 91(1) begins with the words, “Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution.”

He further argued that interpreting Section 108(2)(b) as requiring only two-thirds of members present would undermine the purpose of the constitutional safeguard.

Such an interpretation, he said, would cause the threshold for amending the Constitution to fluctuate depending on the number of lawmakers attending Parliament on a particular day.

Melron C. Nicol-Wilson maintained that both the literal and purposive approaches to constitutional interpretation produce the same conclusion: the special two-thirds threshold under Section 108(2)(b) cannot be displaced by the general majority rule under Section 91(1).

The legal practitioner also questioned the Speaker’s reported reliance on Section 94(2) of the Constitution.

Section 94(2) states that decisions, orders or directions of Parliament, its committees or the Speaker concerning Parliament’s rules of procedure or the application and interpretation of those rules cannot be investigated by any court.

Melron C. Nicol-Wilson argued that the provision does not grant constitutional immunity or infallibility to Parliament and the Speaker.

He said Section 94(2) protects decisions relating to Parliament’s internal rules but does not prevent the courts from examining whether Parliament complied with the Constitution when exercising its powers.

According to him, there is a fundamental difference between interpreting Parliament’s internal procedures and determining the proper meaning of a constitutional provision.

He maintained that a constitutional question does not become an internal parliamentary matter merely because it arose during proceedings in the House.

Melron C. Nicol-Wilson cited APC and Others v Speaker and Others to support his position that parliamentary autonomy does not amount to parliamentary sovereignty.

He said Parliament and the Speaker remain subject to the Constitution because their respective powers and authority are derived from it.

“A decision of the Speaker cannot rewrite the Constitution from the Chair,” Melron C. Nicol-Wilson stated, adding that Section 94(2) cannot place such a decision above the Constitution.

Melron C. Nicol-Wilson also addressed the Speaker’s stated intention to refer the controversy to the Supreme Court for interpretation.

He argued that if sufficient uncertainty existed over the correct interpretation of Sections 91(1) and 108(2)(b), the appropriate step would have been to obtain judicial clarification before Parliament proceeded with the vote.

According to him, a referral made after the vote cannot retrospectively correct an alleged failure to meet the constitutionally prescribed threshold.

He said the referral cannot provide votes that were not cast, alter the number of lawmakers against whom the voting threshold should have been calculated or cure an alleged failure to obtain the required majority.

“The constitutional requirement was either satisfied when the vote was taken or it was not,” Melron C. Nicol-Wilson stated.

He maintained that the issue should not be regarded as a minor procedural irregularity because it affects Parliament’s constitutional authority to pass the Bill.

Melron C. Nicol-Wilson consequently described the decision to permit the Bill to proceed under the lesser threshold as unconstitutional. He further argued that the purported passage of the Bill was null, void and without legal effect.

The legal practitioner expressed confidence that whether the Supreme Court considers a referral for interpretation or an application seeking a declaration of invalidity, it should determine that Section 108(2)(b) cannot be displaced by Section 91(1).

He therefore urged the Supreme Court to declare the purported constitutional amendment invalid when the matter comes before it.

Melron C. Nicol-Wilson concluded the letter with the Latin expression Fiat justitia ruat caelum—“Let justice be done though the heavens fall.” https://thecalabashnewspaper.com/archives/63701