By Amin Kef (Ranger)

As internal political conversations intensify within the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) ahead of its next flagbearer contest, attention has increasingly turned to Vice President Mohamed Juldeh Jalloh and the constitutional implications of a potential bid for the party’s leadership. While political debates are expected in any vibrant democracy, a careful reading of Sierra Leone’s 1991 Constitution suggests that some of the arguments being advanced against his ambition rest more on political interpretation than constitutional mandate.

At the centre of the debate lies a straightforward but crucial question: if Vice President Juldeh Jalloh complies with internal party rules and resigns as Deputy Leader of the SLPP to contest for the flagbearer position, must he also resign as Vice President of the Republic of Sierra Leone?

A constitutional perspective indicates that the answer is no.

Sierra Leone’s constitutional order clearly separates party governance from state governance. While political parties serve as the vehicles through which candidates enter national elections, constitutional offices derive their authority from the electorate through the supreme law of the land. The Vice Presidency is not created by a party constitution; it is established under Sections 54 and 55 of the 1991 Constitution.

Section 42 provides that a presidential candidate shall be nominated by a political party. Section 41 further outlines that such a candidate must be a member of a political party. Those provisions define the entry requirements for participation in presidential elections. However, once elected, both the President and Vice President hold office by constitutional mandate, not by virtue of continued occupancy of party leadership positions.

The distinction between party nomination and constitutional tenure is fundamental.

Critics who argue that resignation from the SLPP Deputy Leader position would automatically dissolve Vice President Mohamed Juldeh Jalloh’s constitutional office appear to conflate internal party office with party membership. Yet the Constitution does not equate the two. The constitutional requirement is that a presidential or vice-presidential candidate be nominated by and belong to a political party. It does not stipulate that the officeholder must continuously hold a specific rank within that party.

That distinction was underscored in the legal and political controversy surrounding former Vice President Samuel Sam-Sumana. In that matter, the issue revolved around ceasing to belong to the political party that nominated him. The vacancy question arose from expulsion and the alleged loss of party membership. The emphasis was on belonging — not hierarchy.

Membership is the constitutional pivot.

Party office is internal structure.

If Vice President Mohamed Juldeh Jalloh were to resign as Deputy Leader to comply with Clause 16C of the SLPP Constitution, he would remain a member of the SLPP. He would not become independent. He would not sever ties with the party that nominated him on a joint ticket. Therefore, the constitutional link established under Section 42 would remain intact.

Section 55 of the Constitution clearly outlines the circumstances under which a Vice President shall cease to hold office. These include resignation from the office itself, removal through constitutional procedures or other clearly defined grounds. Resignation from party leadership is not listed among them.

In constitutional democracies, removal from state office cannot be inferred. It must be explicitly grounded in constitutional text.

To interpret internal party restructuring as a trigger for constitutional vacancy would risk undermining institutional stability. Political parties frequently undergo leadership changes, internal contests and structural adjustments. If each such development had the power to automatically destabilize constitutional offices, governance would become vulnerable to partisan manoeuvring.

The framers of the 1991 Constitution deliberately insulated constitutional offices from that kind of volatility.

Moreover, political ambition while in office is neither unusual nor constitutionally prohibited. Across democratic systems, incumbents routinely seek nomination or re-election while holding office. The Constitution regulates conduct, eligibility and removal not aspiration. Ethical or political debates about fairness are distinct from legal requirements.

Vice President Mohamed Juldeh Jalloh’s potential interest in the SLPP flagbearer position can therefore be viewed as part of the normal evolution of democratic leadership. Internal party rules may require him to resign as Deputy Leader in order to ensure a level playing field within the party contest. That is a matter of party governance. But it does not translate into an automatic constitutional obligation to relinquish the Vice Presidency.

There is also a broader institutional consideration at play. If resignation from party leadership were treated as constitutionally fatal to state office, political actors could weaponize party rules to indirectly influence national governance. Party executives would, in effect, gain leverage over constitutional tenure. That outcome would erode the separation between party authority and state authority; a separation that is vital for democratic resilience.

Sierra Leone’s constitutional supremacy clause makes clear that the Constitution prevails over any inconsistent law or rule. Party constitutions cannot expand the grounds for removal from constitutional office beyond what the national Constitution provides. Internal party compliance may be mandatory within the party structure, but it cannot override constitutional tenure.

In assessing this debate, it is also important to return to the will of the electorate. Vice President Mohamed Juldeh Jalloh was elected as part of a joint ticket nominated by the SLPP. His mandate flows from that electoral choice. So long as he remains a member of the party that nominated him, the constitutional foundation remains secure.

Political competition within the SLPP is a sign of internal democratic vitality. It reflects a party preparing for transition and renewal. Such processes should not be misconstrued as constitutional crises.

The rule of law requires precision. It requires reading what is written, not inserting what is politically convenient. Sections 41 and 42 address party membership and nomination. Sections 54 and 55 govern the Vice Presidency. None of these provisions require continuous occupation of party leadership as a condition for remaining in constitutional office.

From a constitutional perspective, therefore, Vice President Juldeh Jalloh’s potential pursuit of the SLPP flagbearer position does not automatically trigger resignation from the Vice Presidency. Compliance with party rules concerns internal office. Continuation in constitutional office is governed exclusively by constitutional provisions.

Sierra Leone’s democratic stability depends on maintaining that clarity.

In the final analysis, this debate should reinforce rather than weaken constitutional discipline. Ambition may be political. Party leadership may be contested. But constitutional office remains governed by constitutional text.

As the SLPP prepares for its internal processes, the broader national interest lies in ensuring that legal interpretation remains grounded in law, not factional contest. A mature democracy distinguishes between party rivalry and constitutional requirement.

On that measure, the constitutional framework appears clear: resignation from party leadership does not equate to resignation from the Vice Presidency. https://thecalabashnewspaper.com/constitutional-clarity-and-political-continuity-why-vice-president-juldeh-jallohs-flagbearer-ambition-does-not-trigger-resignation/